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Cicchini: The Collapsing Constitution

THE COLLAPSING CONSTITUTION
Michael D. Cicchini*

I.

INTRODUCTION

We live in a hyper-vigilant, tough-on-crime society where the
government uses expansive criminal codes to pursue arrests, convictions
and punishment--even for crimes where no person or property was
harmed in any imaginable sense of the word. One of our defenses
against an aggressive and over-reaching government is the Constitution.
But while the substantive criminal codes of our federal and state
governments are growing exponentially, our constitutional protections
are collapsing--or, perhaps more accurately, have collapsed.
Alarmingly, all levels of the judiciary--especially the Supreme
Court-have contributed to this constitutional collapse. And the Court's
justices are fully aware of what they are doing. For example, in one
recent case, four justices dissented because the majority's decision
turned our Fourth Amendment right of privacy into "a chimera," or
delusion.' About a year later in a second case, four justices dissented
because the majority's decision turned our Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination "upside down."2 Less than a year after that, in
a third case, part of those earlier majorities dissented because the new
majority's decision reduced our Sixth Amendment right of confrontation

* J.D., summa cum laude, Marquette University Law School (1999); C.P.A., University of
Illinois Board of Examiners (1997); M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School (1994); B.S.,
University of Wisconsin-Parkside (1990). Michael Cicchini is a criminal defense lawyer, the
author of TRIED AND CONVICTED: HOW POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND JUDGES DESTROY OUR

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2012), and a coauthor of BUT THEY
DIDN'T READ ME MY RIGHTS! MYTHS, ODDITIES, AND LIES ABOUT OUR LEGAL SYSTEM

(Prometheus Books 2010). He is the author of numerous articles on criminal and constitutional law,
which are available at www.CicchiniLaw.com. He also writes at The Legal Watchdog Blog,
available at www.thelegalwatchdog.blogspot.com.
1. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 361 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
2. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 412 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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to "a shambles." 3 Most recently in a fourth case, an unlikely coalition of
four justices dissented, this time because the majority's
decision
4
Amendment.",
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heart
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blatantly
The courts-again, courts at all levels of both our state and federal
judiciaries-contribute to this constitutional collapse in at least three
ways. First, courts often refuse to find constitutional violations, even in
cases where the facts and the legal precedent overwhelmingly
demonstrate that a violation has, in reality, occurred. Dissenting justices
on the Supreme Court have argued that, in refusing to acknowledge
these constitutional violations, their colleagues are guilty of "not only a
gross distortion of the facts," but also "a gross distortion of the law." 5
Second, when courts have no choice but to concede that a
constitutional violation has occurred, they are eager to create an
exception into which the offending government agent's behavior will fit.
In this context, dissenting justices on the Supreme Court have argued
that their colleagues' "distorted view creates an expansive exception" to
the particular constitutional rule at issue, thus allowing the Court to
circumvent our rights.6 Further, these expansive exceptions can have the
perverse effect "to burden uniquely the sole group for whom the
[Constitution's] protections ought to be most
jealously guarded: people
'
who are innocent of the State's accusations."
And third, even when courts are forced to acknowledge a
constitutional violation and further cannot find or create an exception to
the rule, they can simply refuse to grant the defendant any remedy for
the violation of his rights. Dissenting justices on the Supreme
Court have argued that, quite obviously, a constitutional right ceases
to be "something real" when it is stripped of all meaningful remedies for
its violation.8

II.

WHAT VIOLATION?

The first and easiest way that a court can bypass a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights is simply to hold that, despite the facts
of a particular case and even Supreme Court precedent, no constitutional
violation occurred. This judicial tactic is best illustrated in the context of
the Fifth Amendment.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143,1168 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174.
Id. at 1173.
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989.
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Whenever the police interrogate an in-custody suspect, they must
first advise him of his numerous Miranda rights,9 including the right to
remain silent. When a suspect invokes that right, the police must stop
their questioning; if they do not cease their questioning, the judge must
exclude the defendant's statement from the state's case-in-chief at the
subsequent criminal trial (As an interesting aside, this remedy is
typically a small price for the government to pay; the government is
nearly always better off if the police ignore a suspect's invocation and
instead interrogate him).10
But whether a suspect is in custody and is even entitled to a reading
of the Miranda rights in the first place is often open to debate. This
debate turns on an easily manipulated, fact-intensive, hindsight analysis.
For example, was the suspect politely invited into the interrogation room
before voluntarily entering and willingly answering questions? This
(surprisingly common) judicial finding would lead to the conclusion that
he was not in custody and therefore not entitled to a reading of his rights.
Conversely, did the suspect (or the hypothetical reasonable person in his
position) believe that he had no choice but to follow the orders of the
armed and uniformed police officers who demanded to speak with him?
This (surprisingly rare) judicial finding could lead to the conclusion that
he was in custody and therefore was entitled to a reading of his rights.
Some situations, however, are not really open for debate. For
example, when a defendant is incarcerated and serving a sentence, he is
unquestionably in the sole custody and control of the government.
Therefore, before the police may interrogate him, they must first read
him his rights. Despite this inescapable conclusion, the Supreme Court
still held that such in-custody interrogations, without Miranda warnings,
do not violate the Fifth Amendment. In so doing, the Court created a
new, absurd rule that completely eviscerates the policy and protections
of Miranda v. Arizona:11 an in-custody suspect is not entitled to a
reading of his rights unless he is in "custody within custody.""l The
result: even when the police take a prisoner from his jail cell, withhold
his prescribed and life-preserving medications, and ignore his repeated
statements that he does not wish to talk, Miranda warnings are not
necessary. Rather, the prisoner simply failed to qualify for the elusive
status of being in custody within custody.13

9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467-68 (1966).
10. See Michael D. Cicchini, The New Miranda Warning, 65 SMU L. REv. 911,940 (2012).
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1194 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. Seeid.at 1195.
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As another example, in cases where the police do, in fact, advise a
suspect of his Miranda rights, whether the suspect actually invokes one
of those rights is sometimes open to debate as well. When analyzing
these situations after the fact, some courts have held that statements such
as: "I think I would like to talk to a lawyer,"' 14 or "Could I get a
lawyer?" 15 are (surprisingly) not sufficient to invoke the right to counsel.
Why were these statements insufficient? Because, the courts claim, a
reasonable police officer simply could not be expected to know that the
suspect was asking for a lawyer. This, of course, is disingenuous. When
an interrogator informs a suspect that he has the right to lawyer "prior
to" and "during any questioning,"' 6 how could the interrogator possibly
interpret that particular response--Could I get a lawyer?-as anything
other than a request for a lawyer?
But some invocations of Miranda rights are even clearer. Consider
the situation where the police ask the suspect to sign a form
acknowledging and waiving the right to remain silent. When the suspect
refuses to sign the form, and then remains silent through nearly three
hours of police interrogation, he is obviously invoking his right to
remain silent. Despite this inescapable conclusion, the Supreme Court
has still held that the continued interrogation does not violate the Fifth
Amendment. Instead, the Court created yet another absurd rule that turns
longstanding precedent (and logic) on its head: a suspect's refusal to
sign a waiver form along with his decision to remain silent is not
sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent; instead, such behavior
constitutes a waiver of that right.' 7 This leads to the question: "What in
the world must an individual do to exercise his constitutional right to
remain silent. .. ?'1 While we do not know the answer to that question,
we do know this: actually exercising the right is not legally sufficient to
invoke the right.
In short, no matter how clear-cut the precedent, and no matter how
favorable the facts for the defense, there is no guarantee that a defendant
is entitled to his constitutional protections-even in the rare case where
he is able to appeal a trial court's ruling all the way to the Supreme
Court. Instead, there is a substantial risk that the courts at all levels will
simply dispense with his rights by concluding that there was no
constitutional violation-law and facts be damned.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2000).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 375, 385 (2010).
Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 603 (5th Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
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III.

EXCEPTIONS THAT SWALLOW THE RULE

In cases where a court must find that a constitutional violation has,
in fact, occurred, it can simply carve out an exception into which the
government agent's illegal behavior will fit. Consider, for example, the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures through its warrant requirement. When the police obtain a
warrant and then search a suspect's home, the sworn statements in
support of the warrant are often devoid of probable cause, and the
warrant itself often fails to identify the place to be searched or the items
to be seized. Yet, despite these gross defects, courts routinely excuse the
constitutional violation under one of the broadest exceptions of all: the
good faith exception. That is, the mere act of drafting a warrant and
getting a judge to sign it-no matter how lacking in probable cause or
otherwise defective the warrant might be--constitutes sufficient good
faith on the part of the police to excuse the constitutional violation.' 9
The good faith exception gives judges the incentive to sign any
warrant that law enforcement drafts and places before them. In fact, the
colossal cut-and-paste errors in some warrants (and in the affidavits in
support of those warrants) are strong evidence that judges are not even
reading the documents before dispensing with the suspect's privacy
rights via a stroke of the judicial pen. That is, if judges would actually
read the warrant, and compare it to the officer's (allegedly) sworn
statements made in the affidavit in support of the warrant, the
errors would be so obvious that the judge would refuse to sign it in the
first place.
All of the players in the criminal justice system-defense lawyers,
police, prosecutors, and judges-are fully aware that the majestic
language of the Fourth Amendment is now a mere platitude. In fact, one
judge is even reported to have taken the next logical step by pre-signing
a stack of warrants for the police to use however they wished.2 ° In
reality, this practice is not substantively different than the already
common practice of signing a warrant without reading it and without
scrutinizing the officer's affidavit in support of it. The only difference is
that pre-signing is more convenient for the police and the judge.
However, pre-signing a stack of warrants is a bit too brazen, even
for the government. Such a practice, if allowed, would destroy even the
illusion that the Fourth Amendment still offers us some protection.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 361 F.3d 1005, 1011, 1013 (7th Cir. 2004).
20. See R. Robin McDonald, Judge Targeted for Issuing Blank Warrants, DAILY
=
REP. ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jspid
1202567040654&Judgetargeted for issuing blank warrants&slretum=20130501205935.
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Therefore, the government launched an ethics investigation of this
particular judge and his alleged pre-signing practice. The investigation,
however, was short-lived. The judge resigned a mere two weeks after his
reelection, thus terminating the ethics inquiry.21
But the empty formality of obtaining even a pre-signed warrant is
fast becoming a thing of the past. The police can now rely on so many
judicially-created exceptions-including consent to search, third-party
consent to search,22 search incident to arrest, protective sweep,
abandonment, plain-view, hot-pursuit, other exigent circumstances, and
the inevitable discovery exceptions-that the warrant requirement is
now the exception, rather than the rule.23
In addition to all of these exceptions, the Supreme Court recently
created a new, "vast and scary" exception that permits the government to
search our bodies and collect and store our DNA, without a warrant,
whenever the police can satisfy the amazingly low standard of probable
cause for an arrest. 24 The Court's justification for this new,
unimaginably broad exception is that DNA samples, much like
fingerprints, could in theory permit the government to identify the
arrested suspect from whom the DNA was collected. However, this
newly created identification exception is not based on anything even
loosely resembling reality.
First, as a legal matter, the particular DNA-collection statute that
the Court upheld as constitutional does not allow for "identification" as
one of the uses of the DNA; instead, using it for that purpose (or for any
other purpose not specifically permitted by the statute) would be
punishable by "up to five years' imprisonment., 25 Second, as a practical
matter, the actual DNA results are not even available to the government
until several months after an arrestee has already been identified by
other means and his criminal case has commenced.26 Therefore, instead
21. Consent Order, In re Inquiry Concerning Judge Bryant Cochran (Aug. 15, 2012),
availableat http://www.abajournal.com/files/B.pdf.
22. Government abuse of the third-party consent to search exception was recently approved
by the Supreme Court. When a person refuses to allow the police to search his residence, the police
can simply remove the objector by arresting him, and then obtain consent from someone else who
remains on the premises. Fernandez v. California, No. 12-7822, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Instead of adhering to the warrant requirement, today's decision tells the
police they may dodge it, nevermind ample time to secure the approval of a neutral magistrate.").
23. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, U.
ILL. L. REv. 363, 375 (1999) (referring to the exclusionary rule as "Swiss cheese").
24. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 1983.
26. Id. at 1984 (explaining that DNA was not available for use until long after "bail had been
set, King had engaged in discovery, and he had requested a speedy trial ... by definition, King
could not have been identified by this match").
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of serving any legitimate purpose, the result of this newest exception to
our rights is this: "your DNA can be taken and entered into a national
DNA database if2 7you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for
whatever reason. ,
While the Fourth Amendment may have the greatest number of
judicially-created exceptions designed to swallow the original rule, it is
not even the best example. Consider the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation, which, for our purposes, equates to the defendant's
opportunity to cross-examine his accuser in court. Without that
opportunity for actual face-to-face, in-court confrontation, the accuser's
statement should be excluded from evidence. After all, talk is cheap, and
it would be even cheaper if prosecutors were allowed to win convictions
by having the police recreate on the witness stand what they claim the
accuser said about the defendant.
The courts, however, seem to want convictions, regardless of the
quality of the evidence presented. Therefore, the Supreme Court created
an exception to the right of confrontation: the police can repeat the
accuser's hearsay statement at trial if the police obtained the statement
not in the investigation of a past crime, but rather in response to an
"ongoing emergency., 28 The result: courts now label nearly every
situation as an ongoing emergency. Even where the police are
questioning an accuser about a crime long after-the-fact, and the police
even admit that they questioned the accuser not to render any aid or
resolve an ongoing emergency, but rather "to find out who did this,
period,, 29 the Court will still force the facts into its "expansive
exception., 30 And because all imaginable situations have now become
"emergencies [or] faux emergencies," '31 the rule of confrontation is
swallowed by its newest exception.
IV.

RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDIES

Despite the common use of these two judicial tactics-refusing to
find a constitutional violation or, when a violation is found, creating an
exception to the constitutional rule-a third tactic is even more
unsettling. Even when a court must acknowledge that a constitutional
violation occurred, and even when there is no exception into which the
government agent's behavior will fit-a rare set of facts, indeed-the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.at 1989.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1172 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1174.
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court still has another arrow in its quiver: it can simply acknowledge the
constitutional violation, but then strip the underlying constitutional right
of its only meaningful remedy. Our Supreme Court has already taken the
lead on this front, and has blazed the trail for lower courts to follow.
When the Court strips our fundamental rights of their only
meaningful remedies, it does not honestly and explicitly state what it is
doing. Such honesty would be the functional equivalent of admitting that
it is eliminating the underlying rights. What good is a right, after all, if
there is no way to enforce it and no remedy when it is violated? So
instead, the Court completely ignores the underlying right itself, and
craftily shifts its focus. The new focus, however, will vary depending on
the government's needs and the specific type of constitutional violation.
Consider, once again, the Fourth Amendment. In some cases, the
courts are forced to acknowledge that the police violated the defendant's
right of privacy. Typically though, courts lack the fortitude to do even
that much, often starting their opinions with the catchphrase: "We
32
assume without deciding that a [constitutional] violation occurred.,
And in some of these instances where the courts decide (or assume) the
defendant's right of privacy was violated, they will be unable to fit the
police behavior into one of the numerous, judicially-created exceptions.
In these cases, the courts can still deny defendants relief by simply
ignoring the underlying right and its violation, and instead shifting focus
to a tangential issue-in the case of the Fourth Amendment, the
purported goal of deterring future police misconduct. That is, the courts
hold that when the police violate a defendant's privacy rights, and when
there is no exception into which the police conduct can fit, the remedy of
suppressing evidence is still, in theory, available. However, suppression
of evidence-a defendant's only meaningful remedy-should be the trial
courts' "last resort," and is only justified if it would deter police
misconduct in the future.33
Even on its face, there are several fundamental problems with this
rather peculiar approach. First, the Court completely misses the mark by
ignoring the person-the defendant-whose rights the police just
violated, and instead focuses on hypothetical defendants whose rights
the police might violate in the future.34 The absurdity of this approach is
easily demonstrated with a simple analogy. If, for example, the Court
used this type of reasoning to deny a corporate plaintiff a remedy in a
32. State v. Kosterman, 831 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis added).
33. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140-41 (2009) (majority opinion) (quoting
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
34. See Christian Halliburton, Leveling the Playing Field: A New Theory of Exclusion for a
Post-PATRIOTAct America, 70 MO. L. REV. 519, 539 (2005).
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breach of a commercial contract lawsuit, our nation's business
community simply would not tolerate it; the political pressure would
quickly change the Court's way of thinking.
Second, it is naive to believe that a judge's ruling in a courtroom
could deter or otherwise shape police conduct on the streets. Police
officers care little about what happens inside of a courtroom several
months, or even years, after they make their arrests. The police have
their own culture and their own set of values. 35 The police value arrests,
removing contraband from the community, and obtaining information
from the suspects that they arrest. None of these things are affected by a
judge's decision months or years after the fact. Defense lawyers, police,
prosecutors, and even some trial judges know this. Only in our country's
courts of appeal, and in parts of legal academia, does the myth of
deterrence exist.
Third, even if deterrence was a possibility, and even if the Court
was serious about using deterrence to help formulate the proper remedy
for a constitutional violation, it still completely fails to understand the
concept. That is, the Court has held that deterrence can only be achieved
by suppressing evidence in cases of intentional and egregious police
misconduct. But in reality, this is the very situation where suppression of
evidence could not deter future police misconduct.
Consider the example used by the Court in support of its reasoning.
Suppose a police officer knows that he has no legal grounds to enter and
search a home, and further believes that no court would give him a
search warrant to do so. Despite this, he openly and blatantly violates the
defendant's privacy rights by entering and searching the home. This,
the Court believes, is so egregious that suppression of the evidence in
the subsequent criminal trial would deter this type of misconduct in
the future.36
However, when considering whether to suppress evidence, the
egregiousness of the misconduct does not correlate with the deterrent
effect. In reality, the opposite is true: this type of egregious misconduct
is the one scenario where suppression would not, and could not, deter
future misconduct.37 When faced with the same choice again, the officer
will make the same decision: enter and search the home without legal
grounds, and let the court suppress the evidence later at the subsequent
criminal trial. Why? Because if the police officer respects the Fourth
Amendment and does not search, he will not obtain any contraband and
35. See Slobogin, supra note 23, at 394.
36. Herring, 555 U.S. at 139-40 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914)).
37. See Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence, 75 Mo. L. REV. 459, 474-75 (2010).
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will not make any arrest. However, if he violates the Fourth Amendment
and commits the misconduct by entering and searching the home, he gets
the contraband and the arrest. Even if, months or years later, the suspectturned-defendant is able to resist the lure of a plea bargain and is able to
convince a judge to suppress the evidence, the police are still far better
off than if they had honored the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights:
they still have the contraband.
Deterrence in this context, therefore, is an illusion. However, it is
an illusion that the Court is eager to perpetuate. Focusing on deterrence
of future wrongs allows the Court to ignore the underlying constitutional
right and the defendant whose rights were violated, while at the same
time maintaining the myth that the Fourth Amendment still exists.
The absurdity of the Court's thinking is even more evident when
shifting gears from police misconduct (occurring before the criminal
case is even filed) to prosecutor misconduct at trial. When a prosecutor
commits misconduct at trial sufficient to warrant a mistrial, the
defendant will ask the judge to bar retrial. That is, the defendant argues
that he has once been subjected to jeopardy and the prosecutor, instead
of playing by the rules of criminal procedure, committed misconduct and
caused the mistrial. The prosecutor should not be rewarded with another
try at a conviction; instead, retrial should be barred.
If a trial judge could ever deter a government agent's misconduct,
surely, this is the opportunity to do so. Unlike the police officer, the
prosecutor appears in front of the trial judge nearly every day. And
unlike the suppression of evidence that would occur months or even
years after the fact in cases of police misconduct, the remedy of barring
retrial would occur immediately after, or at least very close to, the
prosecutor's misconduct. Finally, unlike the police, prosecutors care a
great deal about convictions in the courtroom. That is why prosecutors
file and try cases against defendants. To take away the chance at a
conviction when a prosecutor commits misconduct would, surely, deter
prosecutor misconduct in future cases.
Despite this, in cases of prosecutor misconduct, the Court
completely abandons the concept of deterrence as it no longer suits the
government's needs. Instead, the Court shifts the point of inquiry from
deterrence to what is best described as attempted mind reading. In
deciding whether retrial is barred-the only meaningful remedy for a
defendant who was just denied a fair trial by the prosecutor-the Court
instead looks at the prosecutor's state of mind at the time of the
misconduct. Was the prosecutor attempting to "prevail at ...trial by
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impermissible means? '38 If yes, this is permitted, and he is allowed to
retry the defendant after having his free kick at the cat that resulted in a
mistrial.3 9 Conversely, was the prosecutor "intend[ing] to 'goad' the
defendant into moving for a mistrial?" 40 This, the Court believes, is
not acceptable, and the prosecutor would not be permitted to retry
the defendant.4 '
The problems with this bizarre standard are numerous. First, the
Court is, once again, ignoring the defendant, whose rights the prosecutor
just violated. Second, how exactly should a trial judge go about reading
the prosecutor's mind? (Just asking the question demonstrates the
problem.) And third, even if the judge could accurately read the
prosecutor's mind, the Court's test has been set up in such as way as to
automatically deny the defendant the remedy of a final acquittal, and the
prosecutor will be allowed to retry him every time.
More specifically, what prosecutor would have preferred merely to
provoke a mistrial request and then retry the case, rather than win a
conviction by improper means and be done with the case? The test is so
absurd that even a trial judge who honestly attempted to apply the law
would have to conclude that the prosecutor was cheating to win, rather
than cheating in order to do it all over again at a second trial. 42 And
based on this reasoning, the defendant's right to due process becomes a
right without a remedy as the prosecutor, with the full and near-limitless
arsenal of government resources, gets a fresh start and another try at
a conviction.
V.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional collapse, in all of its forms, was not caused by
trial and appellate courts alone. To the extent those courts have been
contributing to the collapse, they have largely been following the
examples set by our Supreme Court. Further, this constitutional collapse
is not attributable to a single political party. Within a recent nine-month
period, our constitutional rights suffered at least two major blows in two
different Supreme Court decisions. As stated earlier in Part I, in one of

38. Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case
Studies in an EmergingJurisprudence,71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 936 (1998).
39. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1982).
40. Id. at 676.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 688 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("It is almost inconceivable that a defendant could
prove that the prosecutor's deliberate misconduct was motivated by an intent to provoke a mistrial
instead of an intent simply to prejudice the defendant." (footnote omitted)).
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those cases the dissent attacked the majority for reducing our
Constitution to "a shambles. ' ' 3 The author of that opinion was Justice
Antonin Scalia, 44 the hyper-conservative Ronald Reagan-appointee and
former bureaucrat in the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford
administrations. In the other case, the dissent blasted the majority for
turning our constitutional protections "upside down. 4 5 The author
of that opinion was Justice Sonia Sotomayor,4 6 the liberal Barack
Obama-appointee, and former Bill Clinton-appointee to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.
As further-and perhaps conclusive-evidence that politics is not
driving the constitutional collapse, both Justices Scalia and Sotomayor
joined forces to dissent from the Court's most recent trampling of our
rights. Their reason: the Court's decision destroys "the very heart of the
Fourth Amendment," and the majority's attempt to justify its holding
47
"taxes the credulity of the credulous."
But debating whether the constitution has been reduced "to a
shambles," or merely "turned upside down," or, as another justice stated,
turned into "a chimera," is a meaningless linguistic exercise. In reality,
all of the justices were correct. The problem is that our Constitution has
devolved from the broad, firm, core principles that once protected all of
us, to a series of easily manipulated rules and exceptions that have
turned our rights into "hollow constitutional guarantee[s]." '4 Further,
"what has been taken away from [these defendants] has been taken away
from us all. ' 49 Worse yet, the disintegration of the Constitution
commonly harms those "who are innocent of the State's accusations." 50
This current state of constitutional law permits judges at all levels
to determine the outcome they want to achieve--often a conviction at
the trial court level, or the affirmance of a conviction at the appellate
court level-and then gives them numerous fact-intensive tests, broad

43. See supra Part 1; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Court's opinion "distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and
leaves it in a shambles").
44. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168.
45. See supra Part I; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 412 (2010) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court's "decision turns Mirandaupside down").
46. Berghuis,560 U.S. at 391.
47. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48.
49.

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173.
Id. at 1176.

50. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989.
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exceptions, and even remedy-stripping tactics to reach that
predetermined outcome. Justice Scalia, in the context of the Sixth
Amendment, has complained that our nation's highest Court should not
be engaging in such low-level, fact-intensive analysis to decide issues of
enormous constitutional significance. 5' But that is the small price that he
and his fellow justices will have to pay in order for the judiciary to keep
its stranglehold on our constitutional rights.

51. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (lamenting the fact-intensive nature of the Court's analysis
in the Sixth Amendment context, Justice Scalia complained: "I do not look forward to resolving
conflicts in the future over whether knives and poison are more like guns or fists for Confrontation
Clause purposes, or whether rape and armed robbery are more like murder or domestic violence.").
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